Director-General/Executive Director
Madame la Présidente,
RSSG Salvador,
Directrice Générale Russel,
Excellences,
Je vous remercie pour l’opportunité de pouvoir intervenir auprès des honorables membres du Conseil de sécurité au sujet de la situation en Haïti, conformément au paragraphe 9 de la résolution 2629 du Conseil de sécurité.
Depuis ma dernière intervention devant le Conseil en janvier, la situation déjà désastreuse sur le terrain en Haïti s’est encore aggravée, entrainant des troubles sécuritaires et humanitaires.
La violence de gangs a pris de l’ampleur dans le pays, augmentant en fréquence ainsi qu’en intensité, et s’étendant géographiquement.
Cette violence est rendue possible par l’afflux continu d’armes à feu en Haïti et est soutenue par la corruption.
Les rapports précédents de l’ONUDC au paragraphe 9 ont abordé les sources et les itinéraires de trafic d’armes vers Haïti.
Le rapport qui vous est présenté aujourd’hui vise à éclairer davantage la situation de sécurité en évolution et les dynamiques des gangs sur le terrain, y compris dans le sud d’Haïti, ainsi que les implications sur le déplacement et l’exploitation des personnes, et la nature des flux financiers illicites en Haïti.
Excellencies,
As you have already heard from SRSG Salvador, the last three months saw a 53 per cent increase in the number of people killed or injured due to gang violence.
Reports of gang attacks and burning of houses over the past hours suggest that the escalation is ongoing.
And rising insecurity continues to drive people to flee.
Our colleagues at IOM report that since early March, almost 95,000 people have fled the capital Port-au-Prince, where the violence is most concentrated.
And last year, over 338,000 Haitians are reported to have left the country, including more than 46,000 people looking to make the perilous journey across the “Darien Gap”.
Growing displacement and situations of extreme vulnerability are heightening risks of migrant smuggling as well as human trafficking.
These conditions warrant further attention and urgent action to protect Haitians, especially as “dark” or untracked vessels continue to be present in Haiti’s maritime zones, possibly engaged in criminal activity.
Distinguished members of the Council,
Recent events suggest concerning signs of collusion between different gangs in Haiti.
Only yesterday, a series of simultaneous attacks took place in several locations of Port-au-Prince, although police and community responses repelled the attacks and limited the damage.
The latest wave of violence saw reported fighting between gangs, but also signs of collaboration between certain groups to carry out attacks.
It is a trend that our Office has observed over the reporting period.
The attacks against key infrastructure in March, which SRSG Salvador has mentioned, saw the two main gang federations, the G9 and GPEP, join forces.
In addition to targeting transport and public service facilities, their assault on prisons in Port-au-Prince freed more than 4,600 inmates, including gang leaders and individuals suspected of involvement in the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse.
The recent prison breaks saw gangs recruit thousands of former prisoners to their ranks, underlining that the prison system needs urgent attention and support.
This is a security priority as well as a human rights issue, as OHCHR has repeatedly flagged poor prison conditions and abusive treatment of inmates.
Madam President,
The gang attacks targeting key infrastructure were another reminder that the firepower available to gangs in Haiti has increased significantly.
UNODC recorded the use of automatic rifles and carbines such as the AR-15, M4, Galil, and the AK series among others, as well as 12-Gauge shotguns, a diverse range of handguns and pistols, and higher calibre weapons such as the M60 machine gun.
Firearms and ammunition continue to flow into Haiti, and a recent criminal trial in the United States gave some important insights into how this happens.
According to information released by the US Department of Justice, a former leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, Mr. Joly Germine, directed trafficking operations from his cell in prison.
Using unmonitored mobile phone calls, Germine instructed the transfer of funds to criminal associates in Florida, who were given specifications for the armaments required and went on to procure them from gun shops, acting as “straw buyers”.
The firearms, which included automatic and high-calibre weapons, were then smuggled to Haiti in containers disguised as food and household items.
In previous reports, UNODC mapped the routes by which contraband is trafficked into the North, East, and West of Haiti.
In this latest report, we examine illegal activities in the South of the country, which is a growing area of concern for trafficking of drugs and firearms, especially when considering its poorly monitored airspace and uncontrolled coastline.
There is a longstanding vulnerability to illicit activities in Southern Haiti, and today both weapons and drugs continue to be shipped to this part of the country by air and by sea.
The Southern departments have become critical entry points for cocaine from South America, and cannabis from the Caribbean, with Haiti being a transit hub for both.
Firearms and ammunition also enter through the Southern coast. They are often transported directly to Port-au-Prince through routes reportedly controlled by gangs affiliated with the GPEP federation, who then play a central role in their distribution among the gangs.
As the report notes, prominent political and business figures are suspected of being involved in criminal markets in Southern Haiti.
They invest in the infrastructure and equipment used in trafficking, showcasing the links between gang violence, trafficking, and political and economic corruption in Haiti.
These networks of collusion are often linked to financial crimes and illicit financial flows, which undermine security, governance, and development.
Since the entry into force of the country’s 2014 anti-corruption law, Haiti’s anti-corruption unit, the ULCC, has reported dozens of cases of financial crimes involving government contracts and public funds.
Authorities have also observed criminal proceeds being laundered through the private sector, notably in the oil and gas sector, as well as through banks, real estate firms, lotteries, and other businesses.
In some instances, non-profit organizations established by public officials are suspected of facilitating money laundering.
Furthermore, gangs engage in kidnapping for ransom, as well as informal taxation on the use of critical infrastructure they control.
Despite the good efforts of the ULCC, alongside Haiti’s Central Financial Intelligence Unit, the UCREF, there have been very few convictions in cases of corruption and organized crime. Reasons include limited capacities, acute politicization, and arbitrary judicial fees.
Excellencies,
As the situation in Haiti continues to deteriorate, allow me to recall the recommendations made in previous UNODC reports to the Security Council.
I wish to reiterate the importance of building Haiti’s national capacities on firearms regulation, as well as border and customs capacities, especially in ports and at the Haiti-Dominican Republic border.
And I wish also to reiterate the need to improve anti-corruption frameworks and investigative capacities.
Implementing these steps is extremely challenging in the current context. But it is also necessary.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime continues to be present and active in Haiti.
We are working in full and excellent cooperation with BINUH to deliver assistance on the ground, to the extent that the situation allows.
Since my last briefing, we have provided training to national practitioners on anti-corruption and financial investigations, as well as asset recovery, including in partnership with UNDP.
And we have, until recently, been helping national stakeholders procure key border management equipment, though delivery will take place when the situation is more conducive.
Given the current challenges, I want to commend the valiant efforts of Haitian law enforcement, who continue to fight on, as shown by the significant seizure of firearms that they recently made in Cap Haïtien in March.
Nevertheless, In the absence of international action to improve Haiti’s security, through the deployment of the multinational security support mission mandated by this Council, alongside a long-term political solution, the circumstances will remain enormously challenging.
The recent formation of the transitional presidential council is a welcome step, made possible through CARICOM’s key role.
But as we have seen with the most recent wave of gang attacks, the obstacles remain daunting.
We must stand with Haiti’s institutions and citizens in confronting violence, corruption, and chaos, and in working for a more stable and secure future for the people of Haiti.
Thank you.
